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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
FRANCIS F. LUND, JACK L. STARKS, 
DONNEL ROBERT GvVYNN, NORRIS 
H. MARSHALL, ELIHU MILLER, CLEO 
S. KING, ROYCE W. 1\tlOON, JAMES 
ALBERT FERGUSON, THEODORE R. 
ATHA, FRED JOHNSON and A. V. 
WILSON, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
-vs-
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
Inc., 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
9119 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this action the plaintiffs claim that their auto-
mobiles were damaged by "soot" or some such material 
emitted from a flare stack maintained by the defendant 
on its premises at its refinery at Woods Cross, Utah. 
At the trial of the case the plaintiffs produced no direct 
evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant but 
relied entirely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
After being instructed with respect to the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur, the jury returned a verdict in favor 
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of the plaintiffs from which the defendant has appealed. 
The flare stack is a steel pipe standing about 45 
feet high and being 6 inches in diameter at its base 
and reducing to a 4 inch diameter at the top (R 147, 148) 
through which gas is emitted and burned (R 149, 150, 
163, 164). It is essentially a safety device through which 
excess gas may be disposed of without damage to various 
units at the refinery (R 151). The gas that moves through 
the flare stack is pure gas and contains no corrosive 
or dangerous impurities (R 152, 167, 172, 173, 221). 
When gas pressures in the various units which are 
connected with the flare stack exceed certain amounts, 
the excess gas can move out through the flare stack 
without harm to any of the refinery units (R 149-151). 
A very elaborate system is maintained to check the 
operations in the refinery (R 161, 165) and the whole 
operation is constantly under the scrutiny of refinery 
personnel (R 161, 165, 205, 206). Some gas is kept con-
tinually moving through the flare stack and burned off 
at the top thus serving the same purpose as a pilot 
flame (R 152). Any excess gas "popped out" of the flare 
stack is immediately burned off when emitted from the 
stack (R 152). 
There is a railroad station immediately to the east 
of the lot where the flare stack is located (R 116). Trains 
run regularly through the vicinity. The Hatch Chemical 
Company is a short distance to the south. This com-
pany handles acids and caustics (R 147). The streets 
that bound the lot where the flare stack is located on 
the south and on the east carry considerable traffic, 
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which traffic handles all types of products ~ even acids 
and corrosive materials (R 146, 147). 
On the 17th day of June, 1958, most of the plaintiffs' 
autmnobiles had been parked generally to the east of 
the flare stack in question. At about 4:30 P.~I. ~Irs. 
Donnel Gwynn, the wife of one of the plaintiffs, drove 
her husband's automobile to the vicinity of the refinery 
where the plaintiffs were working for the purpose of 
picking up her husband after work (R 79). She parked 
on the street to the east of the lot where the flare stack 
was located (R 79), and clain1s to have seen some 
"soot" settling on her car (R 80). She observed the 
flare stack which was about 300 feet west of her car 
( R 183). She noted the orange flame at the top thereof 
being blown to the east by an easterly wind (R. 80), 
and the usual short smoke tail was observed at the 
end of the flame (R 80, 148). She could not, however, 
see "soot" actually being emitted from the flare stack 
(R 87). She could see "soot" in the vicinity of her car 
(R 86, 87), and she could see some "soot" in the air 
back towards the flame, but could not see "soot" all 
the way back to the flare stack (R 90). It seemed to 
be coming from the west (R 88). It was only her con-
clusion that the "soot" was being emitted from the flare 
stack (R 88). 
Later it was discovered that the automobiles belong-
ing to the other plaintiffs had likewise had some "soot'' 
or some such material deposited on them; however, no 
witness was able to testify as to its source. 
The plaintiffs claim that the paint on their automo-
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biles became "pocked" from the "soot." 
Though Mrs. Gwynn testified that "soot'' settled 
all over her husband's automobile while she was parked 
to the east of the lot where the flare stack was located 
(R 85), yet Donnel Gwynn stated that in general the 
"pock" marks were widely dispersed on the car (R 106). 
According to Donnel Gwynn there appeared to be only 
occasional pock marks in an area comparable in size 
to an ordinary sheet of paper 8¥2" by 11". ~r[any such 
areas on his car had no marks whatsoever (R 106). 
The plaintiffs claim that the "soot" was the cause 
of the damage sustained by the automobiles and that 
the "soot" was emitted from the defendant's flare stack. 
Having shown the existence of the flare, the presence 
of the pilot flame with the usual smoke trail at the 
end thereof and an easterly wind, the settling of "soot" 
or other such material on Donnel Gwynn's automobile, 
the plaintiffs rested the case and relied entirely upon 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish the alleged 
negligence on the part of the defendant. No direct 
evidence whatsoever of negligence on the part of the 
defendant was introduced by the plaintiffs. The court 
instructed the jury with respect to the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur (R 51, 52), and the jury found for the 
plaintiffs. 
The defendant contends that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur is not applicable in this case and that there 
is not sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
justifiably conclude that the "soot" that caused the 
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which traffic handles all types of products - even acids 
and corrosive materials (R 146, 147). 
On the 17th day of June, 1958, most of the plaintiffs' 
automobiles had been parked generally to the east of 
the flare stack in question. At about 4 :30 P.~I. Mrs. 
Donnel Gwynn, the wife of one of the plaintiffs, drove 
her husband's automobile to the vicinity of the refinery 
where the plaintiffs were working for the purpose of 
picking up her husband after work (R 79). She parked 
on the street to the east of the lot where the flare stack 
was located (R 79), and clain1s to have seen some 
"soot" settling on her car (R 80). She observed the 
flare stack which was about 300 feet west of her car 
(R 183). She noted the orange flame at the top thereof 
being blown to the east by an easterly wind (R. 80), 
and the usual short smoke tail was observed at the 
end of the flame (R 80, 148). She could not, however, 
see "soot" actually being emitted from the flare stack 
(R 87). She could see "soot" in the vicinity of her car 
(R 86, 87), and she could see some "soot'' in the air 
back towards the flame, but could not see "soot" all 
the way back to the flare stack (R 90). It seemed to 
be coming from the west (R 88). It was only her con-
clusion that the "soot" was being emitted from the flare 
stack (R 88). 
Later it was discovered that the automobiles belong-
ing to the other plaintiffs had likewise had some "soot'' 
or some such material deposited on them; however, no 
witness was able to testify as to its source. 
The plaintiffs claim that the paint on their automo-
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biles became "pocked" from the "soot." 
Though M.:rs. Gwynn testified that "soot'' settled 
all over her husband's automobile while she was parked 
to the east of the lot where the flare stack was located 
(R 85), yet Donnel Gwynn stated that in general the 
"pock" marks were widely dispersed on the car (R 106). 
According to Donnel Gwynn there appeared to be only 
occasional pock marks in an area comparable in size 
to an ordinary sheet of paper 8lf2" by 11". Many such 
areas on his car had no marks whatsoever (R 106). 
The plaintiffs claim that the "soot" was the cause 
of the damage sustained by the automobiles and that 
the "soot" was emitted from the defendant's flare stack. 
Having shown the existence of the flare, the presence 
of the pilot flame with the usual smoke trail at the 
end thereof and an easterly wind, the settling of "soot" 
or other such material on Donnel Gwynn's automobile, 
the plaintiffs rested the case and relied entirely upon 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish the alleged 
negligence on the part of the defendant. No direct 
evidence whatsoever of negligence on the part of the 
defendant was introduced by the plaintiffs. The court 
instructed the jury with respect to the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur (R 51, 52), and the jury found for the 
plaintiffs. 
The defendant contends that the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur is not applicable in this case and that there 
is not sufficient evidence from which the jury could 
justifiably conclude that the "soot" that caused the 
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The flare stack in question is the original flare 
stack which was installed over 25 years ago (R 204). 
The evidence was that this is the only known occasion 
in that period when such a claim for damage from 
substances emitted by the flare stack in question has 
been rnade ( R 153, 204). 
The defendant further contends that the evidence 
in this case does not support a finding by the jury 
that the defendant was negligent. Even if the application 
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was proper, any 
presumption arising from the doctrine was completely 
overcome by the evidence of the care and caution exer-
cised by the defendant in the operation of its refinery 
system, insofar as the flare stack in question was con-
cerned. 
The defendant contends that a glaring error was 
made by the trial court in failing to instruct the jury 
as to its duty to a corporate defendant. The personality 
difference in the parties was most striking. The plain-
tiffs were common working men. The defendant was 
a well-known oil company. Any experience at all in 
the practicalities of jury trials would immediately sug-
gest that the jury in this case would be extremely 
sympathetic to the plaintiffs. Recognizing this practical 
difficulty, counsel for the defendant requested the court 
to instruct the jury in accordance with the instruction 
No. 1.6 of J.I.F.U., which instruction would have admon-
ished the jury with respect to its duty in regard to a 
corporate defendant (R 59). To counsel's utter amaze-
ment and bewilderment, the trial court refused to give 
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such an instruction. The defendant contends that under 
the facts of this case, it was entitled to the protection 
afforded by such instruction. 
POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THE FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS' AUTOMO-
BILES WERE DAMAGED BY "SOOT'' EMITTED FROM THE 
DEFENDANT'S FLARE STACK IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT PERMIT 
THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA 
LOQUITUR. 
POINT III. 
EVEN IF THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR 
WERE PROPERLY APPLIED, ANY INFERENCE ARISING 
THEREFROM WAS OVERCOME AND THE FINDING THAT 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM WAS NEGLIGENT IS NOT SUP-
PORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE DE-
FENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1.6 OF 
J.I.F.U. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS' AUTOMO-
BILES WERE DAMAGED BY "SOOT'' EMITTED FROM THE 
DEFENDANT'S FLARE STACK IS NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE. 
The proximate cause of an injury can never be 
presumed. J,ackson v. Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 P. (2d) 
566 (1949). 
The mere occurrence of an unusual or unexplained 
accident or injury, if not such as necessarily involves 
negligence, does not warrant the application of the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine. Cunningham v. Neil House Hotel 
Co., 33 N.E. (2d) 859 (Ohio 1940). 
The doctrine of res psa loquitur is not applicable 
when the liability of defendant depends on surmise of 
conjecture. Martin v. Southern Pac. Co., 46 F. Supp. 
957 (D.C. Cal. 1942). It must not be allowed to prevail 
where, on proof of the occurrence without more, the 
matter rests only in conjecture. Dail v. Taylor, 66 S.E. 
135 (North Carolina 1909). 
In this case the evidence does not support a finding 
that any harmful substance was emitted from the de-
fendant's flare stack. That the plaintiffs' automobiles 
were damaged does not prove that any harmful sub-
stance was emitted from the flare stack. It is mere 
speculation and conjecture on the part of the jury to 
so conclude. Only Mrs. Donnel Gwynn claims to have 
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seen "soot" particles in the air. She could not see 
them clear back to the flare (R 90). She simply saw 
the orange flare with the usual smoke tail which was 
only inert carbon (R 80, 147, 148, 158). In the vicinity 
of her car she said she also saw "soot" (R. 86, 87). 
The wind blowing to the east caused her to conclude 
that the "soot" she saw was being emitted from the 
stack. The "soot" she saw in the vicinity of her car 
made film all over it (R 85). Yet, Donnel Gwynn says 
the "pock" marks were widely scattered (R 106). There 
is no direct evidence that any "soot" particles seen 
by Mrs. Gwynn had their origin from the flare stack 
or that damage came from the "soot." This is only her 
conjecture (R 88). There is not any evidence that any 
"soot" particles seen by Mrs. Gwynn in the vicinity 
of the car was the substance that damaged the paint 
on the automobiles. Sh~ saw a film of "soot" all over 
her automobile, yet pock marks were widely dispursed 
(R 85, 106). :Mr. Gwynn testified that in an area the 
size of an ordinary sheet of paper 81f2" by 11" there 
was possibly a mark or two, and in many areas on his 
car no dmnage was observable (R 106). 
The testimony of James Kenney (R 167, 168) was 
confirmed by Dr. Sugihara (R 173) that no corrosive 
or harmful substances were emitted frmn the flare stack. 
l{enney's testimony is further supported by the evidence 
showing the presence of the original flare stack without 
any corrosive damage whatsoever (R 204). This is the 
first such claim in the history of the operation of the 
flare stack. Painted and metallic surfaces in the area 
have never been damaged in the past (R 204, 205). 
10 
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Expert and cmnpetent witnesses testified that the smoke 
trailing the flare on top of the stack was si1nply carbon 
black which is chemically inert (R 147, 148, 158). 
As further proof of the absence of any corrosive 
material in the flare stack, James Kenney performed 
the following experiment on the tailgate of a new 
Chevrolet pick-up truck (R 192 193): 
' 
"The so-called drip tank is about nineteen 
feet long and has a catch basin or drip accumula-
tor. So immediately two days following this inci-
dent, I went out and drew about a half a pint 
of the liquid collected in here. It was mostly 
water with a little hydrocarbon on top of it. I 
would say in the range of a butane Lpg, and 
I took it in the building and poured it in a small 
can and lit it off, and the fact that it was a 
small can, it gave a very smoky oxygen deficiency. 
Then I held the tail gate over that, so that the 
smoke and this burning liquid, that they deposited 
on the tail gate. Then in the middle of the tail 
gate I took the remainder of the liquid, the 
liquid itself, and poured it on the tail gate. 
Then on the opposite end I took some natural 
gas of Mountain States Fuel. I could have done 
it at home on my stove, but I procured an 
oxygen-deficiency flame by plugging off oxygen 
to the burner, and it produced yellow, smoky 
flame, and I deposited that on the other end of 
the tail gate, let them sit two days, and examined 
it and could find no damage to the paint, and 
re-examination now after a year's time, the only 
damage we can find is the very slight stain where 
the liquid was poured, which will wipe off." 
The painted surface of the tailgate was not damaged 
11 
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in the least. The tailgate was admitted in evidence (D-11; 
R. 194) and even after more than a year's time the 
painted surface showed no damage whatsoever. 
Had there been any injurious substances in the flare 
system its concentration would have been greater in 
the liquid in the drip tank than at the flame (R 194). 
The material that damaged the plaintiffs' automo-
biles simply had to come from some other source. 
On this point there is considerable similarity be-
tween the instant case and the case of J.ackson v. 
Colston, 116 Utah 295, 209 P. (2d) 566 (1959). In this 
case the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant 
for the alleged burning of her lower leg claimed to have 
been inflicted while she was undergoing weight reducing 
treatment administered by the defendants. It was her 
theory that the lamp that had been used by the defendant 
was the cause of the burning. There appeared to be 
no doubt that the plaintiff was burned, that there 
was a lamp, that it was pointed in her direction, and 
was used in her treatment over a period of time. She 
testified that after about five treatments she noticed 
her ankle was becoming inflamed, etc. On the other 
hand there was expert testimony regarding the nature 
of the lamp; that the lamp was not a heat producing 
lamp; that a person would be more likely to suffer 
burn from having been exposed to sun light on a sum-
mer's day for ten minutes than it would have from 
exposure to the infra-red lamp for the same period; 
and that a normal person's flesh could not be burned 
under the same conditions. The trial court directed '\ 
12 
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verdict for the defendants. On appeal this court said: 
"The only question here to be decided is 
whether the court erred in directing a verdict 
for the defendants. It is fundamental that the 
burden rests upon the plaintiff to establish the 
causal connection between the injury and the 
alleged negligence of the defendant; Tremelling 
v. Southern Pac. Co., 51 Utah 189, 170 P. 80; that 
the court may not permit the jury to speculate 
concerning defendants' liability; Dern Inv. Co. 
v. Carbon County Land Co., 94 Utah 76, 75 P. 
2d 660; and that the court is required to direct 
a verdict unless there is evidence from which 
the jury could reasonably find in favor of the 
plaintiff. 
"Plaintiff contends that the doctrine of res 
ipsa loquitur should be applied which, if con-
sidered together with plaintiff's testimony and 
the medical evidence on her behalf, was sufficient 
to require the court to submit the cause to the 
jury. It is unnecessary for us to rule upon whether 
the doctrine contended for ought to be invoked 
because even if we were to so decide, it would have 
no effect on the propriety of the ruling of the 
trial court.* * * 
"In a proper case, the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur may relieve the plaintiff of the duty 
of showing specfic acts of negligence, but the 
authorities unanimously hold that the casual con-
nection between the alleged negligent act and 
the injury is never presumed and that this is a 
matter the plaintiff is always required to prove 
affirmatively. Res ipsa loquitur is limited to the 
question of whether the defendant was negligent 
-it has nothing to do with the element of causa-
tion. In Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power 
13 
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Co. v. Htmt, 9 Cir., 223 F. 952, 955, 139 C.C.A. 
432, the rule is stated as follo-ws: '* * * In every 
personal injury case the plaintiff must establish 
two propositions : First, that the defendant was 
negligent; and, second, the causal connection 
between the negligence and the injury com-
plained of. Negligence is sometimes presumed, 
as in cases where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
applies, or where there has been a violation of 
a statutory duty, but the proximate cause of an 
injury i·s never presumed. On this question there 
is no conflict of authority.' See also Howe v. 
Michigan Cent. R. Co., 236 Mich. 577, 211 N.W. 
111; Alabama Power Co. v. Bryant, 226 Ala. 
251, 146 So. 602; Allen v. Republic Bldg. Co., 
Tex. Civ. App., 84 S.W. 2d 506." (Italics added) 
After setting forth the law governing the case, the 
court turned to the evidence in the record and stated: 
"In the instant case, apart from the question 
of negligence, we have the problem of whether 
the injury to plaintiff's left ankle was caused 
by the heat from defendants' lamps. The fact 
that the plaintiff was injured does not raise a 
presumption or authorize an inference that the 
defendants' acts or on1issions proxilnately caused 
the injury. The important question in the case 
before us, therefore, is not, should the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur apply to establish negligence, 
but rather, is there any evidence from which a 
jury could find that the lamps used by de-
fendants were the proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injuries~ On this question defendants' expert 
witness, Dr. Plu1nb, testified as to the construc-
tion, operation and heat producing effects of 
both lamps. As to the first, or what was identi-
fied as the depolray la1np, his testimony was that 
it could have no possible effect upon the human 
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body and that it would not produce nwre heat 
than an ordinary 25-watt globe; that it was in 
the nature of a 1nagnet and that a greater mnount 
of magnetism passes through the body of every 
one by reason of the earth's natural magnet than 
could be created by this lmnp. * * * 
"Analyzing the testimony to determine 
whether or not plaintiff has sustained a burden 
of proving a causal connection between the al-
leged negligent acts of the defendants and the 
injury to the plaintiff, we find that under the 
present record the jury would be required to 
speculate and guess on too many elements in 
the chain of causation." 
And so it is with the instant case. The jury ca11 
only speculate as to whether any harmful substance 
was ever emitted from the flare stack, and if so, whether 
such hannful substance was the precise substance de-
posited on the plaintiffs' automobiles that caused the 
damage. Mrs. Gwynn saw the flare burning on top of 
the stack (R 80). She saw a trailing of smoke (R 80). 
This smoke was clearly carbon black and inert (R 147, 
148, 158, 236). She states that some material was de-
posited on her automobile (R 85). The jury can only 
speculate that the substance that damaged the paint 
came from the flare stack. It cannot ignore the testimony 
presented by the defendant. 
Competent witnesses testified that no such harmful 
material could be emitted and that if any black "soot" 
was seen trailing the flame at the top of the flare stack 
the same would be nothing but pure carbon and com-
pletely chemically inert (R 147, 148, 158). 
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~rhe substance which damaged the plaintiffs' auto-
nwbiles could have come from the acid plant or could 
have been blown from some diesel or other vehicle 
or train passing by on one of the highways or tracks 
adjoining the lot where the plaintiffs' automobiles were 
parked or frmn some other unknown source. It is nothing 
but speculation or conjecture to find that the "soot" 
or whatever the substance was that damaged the plain-
tiffs' auton1ohiles came from the flare stack. 
It appears that the jury employed the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur not only to find negligence on the 
part of Phillips but to find that "soot" was emitted 
from the flare stack and dmnaged plaintiffs' automobiles. 
This it cannot do. Armour & Co. v. Leasure, 9 A. (2d) 
572 (Md. 1939). 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDEN·CE IN THIS CASE DOES NOT PERMIT 
THE APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA 
LOQUITUR. 
Since the plaintiffs at the trial of the case relied 
entirely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to establish 
the alleged negligence of the defendant it is obviously 
necessary that the evidence support every element re-
quired for the application of the doctrine. 
(a) Eleuwnts necessary to invoke the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquiJhtr: 
In order to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, 
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this court has recognized that the following elements 
must be present: 
"(1) That the accident was of a kind which, 
in the ordinary course of events, would not have 
happened had due care been observed; (2) That 
it happened irrespective of any participation by 
the plaintiff; and (3) That the cause thereof 
was something under the management or control 
of the defendant, or for which it is responsible." 
Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply Company, 
5 Utah (2d) 373, 302 P. (2d) 471 (1956) 
(b) Proof of element No. 1 is totally lacking. 
Now, for the sake of argument, if it be assumed 
that "soot" from the defendant's flare stack did cause 
the damage to the plaintiffs' automobiles the situation 
is not ~like the case of Zampos v. Uni,ted Smelt1ing, 
Refining and Mining Co. 206 F. (2d) 171 (·CCA-10, 
1953). In that case an action was brought for the 
recovery of damages caused by a flood. The plaintiffs 
in their complaint alleged that the defendants owned 
certain mining property in Bingham Canyon, Utah; that 
the plaintiff owned certain property situated near such 
nrining property; that the defendants negligently stored 
water in the tunnels and drifts of its mining property; 
that it negligently allowed this stored water to sweep 
down upon the property of the plaintiff and that damage 
resulted. The defendants denied negligence and pleaded 
that the flood water was unusual, extraordinary, un-
precedented, and not reasonably to be anticipated by 
any ordinary prudent person, etc. There apparently was 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and on motions 
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for su1nn1ary judg1nent the trial court entered judgment 
for the defendants. The plaintiff relied upon the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur. Said the court: 
"* * * It is the law in Utah that in order 
for a plaintiff to prevail upon the doctrine of 
res ipsa loquitur he must show that the thing 
or instrumentality which caused the injury was 
in the exclusive custody and control of the de-
fendant; that the accident or occurrence was of 
a character which ordinarily does not occur in 
the absence of negligence; and that when these 
facts are shown the evidence is sufficient to 
warrant an inference that the defendant did not 
exercise due care. Zoccolillo v. Oregon Short Line 
Railroad Co., 53 Utah 39, 177 P. 201; Angerman 
Co., v. Edgemon, 76 Utah 394, 290 P. 169, 79 
A.L.R. 50. The inference arises in part from the 
fact that the happening was such that it would 
not be likely to occur unless someone was negli-
gent. White v. Pinney, 99 Utah 484, 108 P. 2d 
249. And if the circumstances are equally con-
sistent with a cause which would not be attribut-
able to negligence, the doctrine does not apply. 
Jenson v. S. H. Kress & Co., 87 Utah 434, 49 
P. 2d 958. The mining property in question was 
in the exclusive custody and control of the de-
fendant. But there was a complete absence of 
any showing that the flood U'as of a character 
which ordinarily does not occur in the absence 
of negligence. The circu1nstances disclosed were 
equally consistent with a cause not attributable 
to negligence on the part of the defendant. The 
facts were not sufficient to sustain an inference 
that the defendant was negligent either in storing 
the water on its pren1ises or knowingly permitting 
it to accumulate there, or that it accumulated 
there under circumstances with which the defend-
ant in the exercise of ordinary care should have 
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been familiar." (Italics added) 
Assuming without adn1itting that ''soot" did cause 
the dan1age to plaintiffs' automobiles, such an occurence 
would not be an~, indication that the company was negli-
gent. The flare stack is a necessary part of and is 
located at a refinery operation. What evidence is there 
to show that the incident complained of would not have 
happened in the ordinary course of events had due care 
not been observed. 
Assun1ing for the sake of argurnent that a substance 
might on this one particular occasion have been ernitted 
from the flare stack that does not raise any inference 
of negligence. As was stated in the Zampos case ". . . 
there was a complete absence of any showing that the 
flood (soot) was of a character which ordinarily does 
not occur in the absence of negligence. The circumstances 
disclosed were equally consistent with a cause not at-
tributable to negligence on the part of the defendant." 
For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to be applicable, 
it is essential that it shall appear that the transaction 
in which the accident occurred was in the exclusive 
management of the defendant and that all elements 
of the occurrence were wtihin his control, and that the 
result was so far out of the usual course that there 
was no fair ~nference that it could have been prod~tced 
by any other cause than negligence. Clark v. Pennsyl-
vania Power & Light Co., 6 A (2d) 892 (Pa. 1939). 
(Italics added.) 
In order to render the res ~psa loquitur doctrine 
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applicable the nature and circumstances of accixlent must 
be of such character that there could be no reasonable 
inference but that the injury complained of was due to 
defendant's negligence or to the negligence of others 
for whose ,acts the defendant is legally responsible. 
Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 158 S.W. (2d) 
721 (Tenn. 1942). (Italics added) 
(c) Proof of element No. 2 is totally lacking. As 
stated in Wightman v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. supra, 
it is also fundamental that for the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur to be applicable the instrumentality causing the 
dmnage must be shown to be in the exclusive control of 
the defendant. Assuming that "soot" in this case did 
cause the damage, there is no direct showing that the 
origin of the "soot'' was in the control of the defendant, 
or that it was emitted from any of the facilities owned 
and operated by the defendant as discussed in Point No. 
1 of this brief. As already noted the plaintiffs have 
merely shown their damage, the wind direction and 
the existence of the flare stack and flame from which 
they would have the jury infer that the "soot" came 
from the flare stack and caused the damage to the 
plaintiffs' automobiles. In other words, from weak in-
conclusive circumstantial evidence the jury inferred that 
the "soot" came from the flare stack of the defendant. 
Having 1nade this inference the jury then took the next 
step and with the aid of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
inferred that the defendant Phillips Petroleum Company 
was negligent in spite of the elaborate testin1ony on the 
part of the defendant's witnesses regarding the care 
·that had been taken. We thus have an inference upon 
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an inference which has long been conden1ned in the 
law. 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Sec. 116. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can never be 
invoked to prove that the agency causing the injury 
was in control and possession of the defendant, since 
such fact must be proved by "evidence" and not by 
"presumption" which is not evidence. Armour & Co. 
v. Leasure, 9 A. (2d) 572 (~fd. 1939) 
Other possible sources of the "soot" causing the 
damage to plaintiffs' automobiles were not eliminated. 
It is well settled that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur 
does not apply in the case of an unexplained accident 
which may have been attributable to one of several 
causes for some of which the defendant is not responsible. 
Where the evidence shows that an accident may 
have happened as the result of one of two or more 
causes, and it is not more reasonably probable that it 
was due to the negligence of the defendant than to any 
other cause, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not 
apply. Benkendorfer v. Garrett, 143 S.W. (2d) 1020 
Tex., Civ. App. 
If the accident can be accounted for on any reason-
able theory other than that of defendant's negligence, 
the maxim of res ipsa loquitur will not be applied. Paul 
v. M osberg Realty Corporation, 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 766 (N. 
Y. City Ct. 1942). 
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine does not apply, 
where defendant does not have control or management 
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of the thing causing the injury. Kentucky Utilities Co. 
1/. S1.~tton's Adm/r, 36 S.W. (2d) 380 (Ky. 1931). There 
n1ust be direct testimony therefore demonstrating that 
the injury can1e from the stack. This can not be inferred. 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur rests upon necessity 
of requiring defendant to explain how the injury 
occurred where the explanation is peculiarly and ex-
clusively within his knowledge, but does not require 
defendant to show that plaintiff was injured by an 
instnunentality not under his control. JJie.adows v. Pat-
ter~on, 109 S.\V. (2d) 417 (Tenn. 1937). 
~l_1he rule is not applicable where the result might 
have been caused by one of two causes neither of 
which is excluded by evidence. J.liartin v. Arkansas Power 
& Light Co., 161 S.W. (2d) 383, (Ark. 1942). 
To justify the invocation of the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine instrumentality which caused injury sued for 
must have been under defendant's exclusive management, 
and the doctrine is inapplicable where the cause of the 
accident is unexplained and it might have been due to 
one of several causes for smne of which defendant is 
not responsible. Davidson v. American Liq_u~d Gas Cor-
poration, 89 P. (2d) 1103 (Cal. 1939) 
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur rests upon the 
assu1nption that the thing which causes the injury is 
under the exclusive management and control of the de-
fendant, and that the accident is such as in the ordinary 
course of events does not happen without fault; of de-
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explanation sufficient to rebut inference that defendant 
failed to use due care. To overcmne inference of negli-
gence arising from operation of rule of res ipsa loquitur, 
defendant is not required to account for the occurrence 
and show the actual cause of injury, but merely to rebut 
the inference that he failed to use due care. Davis v. 
Teche Lines, 7 So. (2d) 365 (La. 1942) 
The application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitu1· 
does not give a plaintiff an absolute right to a judgment, 
but where the defendant produces evidence to rebut the 
inference of negligence arising under the doctrine, it 
is ordinarily a question of fact whether such inference 
has been dispelled. Druzanich v. Criley, 122 P. (2d) 53 
(Cal. 1942) 
Even if the jury had been justified in inferring 
that the "soot" caused the damage, and inferring that 
the "soot'' came from defendant's flare stack, what evi-
dence is there of any negligence on the part of Phillips. 
Absolutely none! The plaintiffs have relied wholly upon 
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Defendant's evidence 
from impartial third party experts proved there was 
no negligence and as a matter of law, in absence of 
any further proof by plaintiff, any inference of negli-
gence on the part of Phillips has been completely 
overcome. 
There IS no suggestion in the evidence of what 
Phillips could or should have done to have prevented 
the "soot" from escaping from the flare stack-assuming 
that it came from the stack. There is no intimation of 
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what precautions Phillips should have taken. There is 
a total lack of any direct evidence showing negligence 
on the part of Phillips. On the other hand the record 
is repleat with testi1nony showing the care with which 
Phillips eonducts its operatons (R 161, 165, 168, 205, 
206). Special attention has been given to the flare stack 
itself (R 153, 156). 
Con1petent witnesses testified that no such harmful 
n1aterial could be emitted and that if any black "soot" 
was seen trailing the flame at the top of the flare stack 
the same would be nothing but pure carbon and com-
plete!)~ chemically inert (R 154 ,167, 168). 
An inference of negligence arising from the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur has been completely overcome. The 
evidence does not support a finding by the jury that 
Phillips was negligent. 
POINT IV. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY IN ACCORDAN·CE WITH THE DE-
FENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 1.6 OF 
J.I.F.U. 
The defendant in its fourth request (R. 59) asked 
the court to instruct the jury as follows: 
"The defendant Phillips Petroleum Company, 
requests the court to instruct the jury in accord-
ance to the following instructions contained in the 
book, Jury Instruction Forms For Utah: 
2.1, 2.3, 1.6, 15.1, 16.6" 
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Particularly was it error for the court to refuse 
' ' '1 ' 
to instruct the jury in accordance with instruction 1.9 
which if given would have read as follows: 
"It is your duty to hear and determine this 
case the same as if it were between two individ-
uals. The fact that plaintiff is an individual and 
the defendant is a corporation should make no 
difference whatever to you. You should look 
solely to the evidence for the facts and to the 
Instructions given you by the court for the law, 
and return a true and just verdict according to 
the facts established by the evidence under the 
law as laid down by the court, without reference 
to the individual or private character of the plain-
tiff or to the business or corporate character 
of the defendant. The defendant corporation is 
entitled to the same equal protection under the 
law as are all other individuals." 
It is hard to conceive of a case where such an instrur-
tion was more appropriate and necessary than the instant 
case. Here we have one of the large oil companies of 
the United States being sued for a relatively small 
sum by ordinary worlanen. One needs no experience 
in the practicalities of court trials or the rudiments of 
psychology to recognize that in this welfare era in which 
we are living Phillips Petroleum Company is going to 
be stuck for the damages if such a matter ever goes to 
the jury. And that is exactly what happened. It cannot 
be certain that the cautionary instruction, if given by 
the court, would have caused the jury to render a 
different decision. But certainly if justice is to be done 
and if the defendant is not going to be taken advantage 
of because of its large corporate status, the least it 
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sl~ould be able to expect is such an instruction. Under 
the circun1stances of this case it was error to refuse 
the instruction. 
We are not unrnindful of some authorities which 
have held that a corporation is not, as a matter of right, 
entitled to such an instruction. See 19 C.J.S., Corpora-
tions, Sec. 1340 p. 1056; Fletcher Cyclopedia Corpora-
tion, Vol. 9 Sec. 4687. However, we have not found any 
case so holding where the difference between the parties 
was as striking as it is in the instant case. Whatever 
n1ight have been the result of past rulings on this 
question in other jurisdictions involving different parties 
and different circumstances such should not be control-
ling here. In this state we have available the excellent 
compilation of instructions, Jury Instructions Forms for 
Utah. The requested instruction is found among the ap-
proved instructions contained therein. With modern 
juries inclined to be liberal with corporate funds, .it 
cannot be certain that the jury would have heeded the 
admonition contained in the requested instruction, but 
without the instruction, Phillips Petroleum did not have 
a chance. 
The trial court should have granted the defendant's 
!1otion to Dismiss when the plaintiffs rested their 
case. Having failed to grant that n1otion it should 
have directed a verdict in favor of Phillip's Petroleum 
Company when all of the evidence was in. 
The case should be remanded to the District Court 
with instructions consistent with the foregoing. 
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Respectfully submitted, 
McKAY AND BURTON 
Y{f/ /Ad lf'{t( '?A 
By ___ ~ _________ C':Y__f£_~-----------~k-~~-c~/~/ 
Macoy A. McMurray 
Attorneys for PhiUips Petrol-
eum Company, Inc., 
Defendant and Appellant 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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